

SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND

CONFLICT SNAPSHOT & BASELINE ASSESSMENT

Project: "Dumisha Amani Zanzibar - Strengthening Community Peace Mechanisms in Zanzibar"

SUBMITTED TO SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND

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Table of contents

List of table and figures	18
Abbreviations	19
Executive summary	20
1. Background information	22
2. Methodology	25
2.1 Objectives	25
2.2 Data collection and analysis	25
2.3 Challenges and limitations	28
3. Research findings	29
1. Electoral violence	29
2. Capacity of stakeholders to act as informal mediators and champions for peace	30
3. Existing platforms and collaborative initiatives to de-escalate tensions	32
4. Community awareness and readiness to joint conflict-prevention efforts	33
5 Election grievances and the development of radicalization and recruitment	35
6. Risks to the project	36
7. Project indicators baseline value	38
6. Conclusions and recommendations	49

List of table and figures

Tables

1	Community survey	12
2	Stakeholder survey	13
3	List of Focus Group Discussions	13
4	Project risks	24
5	Opportunities to discuss or address post-election and broader community tensions (sex and age)	25
6	Opportunities to discuss or address post-election and broader community tensions (location)	26
7	Community influencers acting as informal mediators (sex, age, location)	27
8	Stakeholders using conflict transformation or similar non-violent strategies (sex, age, location)	27
9	Stakeholders engaging in dialogue or collaboration with people from another group (sex, age, location)	28
10	Stakeholders seeing any value in collaboration to address issues emerging during the electoral period (sex, age, location)	29
11	Community members that that heard of community stakeholders collaborating for peace during the election period (sex, age)	30
12	Community members that that heard of community stakeholders collaborating for peace during the election period (location)	31
13	Stakeholders that can mention at least one concrete example of skills used in conflict transformation (sex, age, location)	32
14	Community members that can have heard of the Road Maps for Peace and/or Zanzibar Conference (sex, age)	33
15	Community members that can have heard of the Road Maps for Peace and/or Zanzibar Conference (location)	33
16	Baseline indicators	34

Figures

1	Location where the community questionnaire has been conducted	12
2	Level of education - community survey	13
3	Employment status - community survey	13
4	Self-perception as a community influencer	17
5	Opportunity to discuss or address electoral tensions	17
6	More space for political dialogue and to address tensions in the last two months (location)	18
7	More space for political dialogue and to address tensions in the last two months (age)	18
8	Do you think that collaborative forums de-escalate tensions?	19
9	Had you ever heard of SFCEG before?	19
10	Do you think that religious differences limit the ability to address tensions in Zanzibar?	20
11	Do you engage in dialogue or collaboration with people from another group(s)?	20

- 1 Do you see any value in collaboration to address issues emerging during the
- 2 electoral period?

Abbreviations

ACT	Alliance for Change and Transparency
AP	Agency for Peacebuilding
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CUF	Civic United Front
CYD	Center for Youth Dialogue
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GNU	Government of National Unity
JUMAZA	Association of Muslim Leaders
JUWAUZA	Jumuiya ya Wanawake wenye Ulemavu Zanzibar
KII	Key Informative Interview
MOZ	Mufti Office in Zanzibar
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
UAMSHO	The Association for Islamic Mobilisation and Propagation
VE	Violent Extremism
VP	Vice President
ZAC	Zanzibar Aid Commission
ZAFAYCO	Zanzibar Fighting Against Youth Challenges Organization
ZEC	Zanzibar Electoral Commission
ZLSC	Zanzibar Legal Services Centre

Executive summary

Tanzania is historically regarded as politically stable compared to other countries in East Africa. Yet, in the last seven years, the country has experienced occasional violent extremist incidents. This increased incidence of violent conflicts has been linked to various political, social and economic grievances.

This narrative is particularly true in the semi-autonomous archipelago of Zanzibar, which holds ambitions for increased autonomy and frequently chafes at the control exerted by the mainland government. Distrust between political parties and between government and communities has steadily increased, and continued socio-economic disparities have contributed to the disillusionment of many in Zanzibar. The current Government of National Unity (GNU), which has been formed by Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the ruling party, and the main opposition political party in Zanzibar, the Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT) Wazalendo political party, represents a new beginning for peace mechanisms.

Against this backdrop, the project *Dumisha Amani Zanzibar* ("Strengthening Community Peace Mechanisms in Zanzibar"), funded by the European Commission and led by Search for Common Ground (SFCG), intends to strengthen alternative peacebuilding mechanisms at the community level to de-escalate and peacefully resolve conflicts in Zanzibar, including both Pemba and Unguja. The overall purpose of this *Conflict Snapshot & Baseline Assessment* is to provide rapid insight into the conflict dynamics in the electoral conflict in general, and more specific to the post-election period to inform the project implementation.

Data collection and analysis were carried out by the Agency for Peacebuilding (Consultant) with the support of Search's Tanzania team. This study used a mixed approach that combines qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. Quantitative tools included a survey conducted among local communities (419 respondents) and a survey with local stakeholders and government (51 respondents) after the FGDs or the KIIs.

The key findings of the study are organized around six sections following the main objectives of this exercise: electoral violence, capacity of stakeholders to act as informal mediators and champions for peace, existing platforms and collaborative initiatives to de-escalate tensions, community awareness and readiness to joint conflict-prevention efforts, election grievances and the development of radicalization and recruitment and risks to the project. Overall, several disparities emerged between Pemba and Unguja and these should be fully considered during the project's implementation

Qualitative data collected through interviews and focus groups show that most respondents witnessed electoral-related violence both in Pemba and Unguja as the polarized political environment facilitated the spread of violence during and after the electoral period. In this context, it seems more pertinent to adopt the expression "electoral violence" more than "post-electoral violence." This accuracy can help to read and interpret both the violence occurring during the vote and the structural issues and constraints imposed in the pre-vote phase.

Both qualitative and quantitative data show that there is a perceived huge capacity of different stakeholders, but also community members, to act as informal mediators and champions for peace in their communities. Quantitative analysis also shows that approximately 2/3 of the Zanzibarian population, both male and female, use "conflict transformation or similar non-violent strategies." Then, on the post-electoral tensions, 42% of the overall population responded that they had the opportunity to discuss or address those tensions. Finally, during the interviews and focus groups discussions, several respondents mentioned that, in the last months, the political authorities are more open to dialogue. These data are confirmed by the community survey. In fact, the data show that in March-April 2021 half of the population experienced more space for political dialogue and to address tensions.

Furthermore, the majority of the population in Zanzibar considers different collaborative forums as useful to de-escalate tensions (see figure below). These platforms or other joint initiatives therefore represent an opportunity to strengthen social cohesion and conflict transformation mechanisms. In

addition, due to the fact that religious leaders have been mentioned as relevant stakeholders by different respondents, it is important to mention that the population survey shows that religious differences are not considered a limitation to address tensions.

Moreover, the analysis shows that the collaboration between the two main political parties in Zanzibar is still complex. In fact, several informants shared that the main divisive line in the islands is between two main political parties (CCM and ACT). Yet, the largest majority of respondents (86.3%) see the collaboration to address issues emerging during the electoral period as important. When it comes to the role of women, Overall, women's space has improved in the last year, but traditional constraints remain for a public engagement in the public space.

When it comes to the correlation between election grievances and violent extremism, the data collected have not shown an emerging, including some cases of development of radicalization and recruitment. However, it should be highlighted that there is a general security practice by the Tanzania government to not publicly report or entertain discussions surrounding violent extremism. This practice could bias the data collection in this field. Even with attack incidents like those that happened on the southern border of Tanzania, the government made deliberate actions not to amplify the extremist actions and impacts.

Finally, the report analysed challenges and risks that should be carefully considered in implementing the project. The political field remains highly divisive and this issue should inform all the actions. Some areas in particular can create tension, such as the reform of the electoral law. Furthermore, the tensions between Pemba and Unguja are high and the population on the island of Pemba appears with less awareness and readiness to joint conflict-prevention efforts and avenues to address their concerns compared to Unguja peacefully. In addition, while Pemba deserves attention by peacebuilding projects, the government of Zanzibar would not fully approve increased attention because it is an "opposition stronghold". The project can also present risks that some activities would not be approved by the local government. Moreover, the Tanzania government does not publicly report or entertain discussions surrounding violent extremism. From a gender perspective, it seems that some women or women groups could be excluded if they do not have a safe space (e.g., for females only) to participate. Also, groups with disabilities encounter severe difficulties in social and political life. Other risks and tensions mentioned during the KIIs and FGDs are human rights conflicts between citizens and especially Zanzibar special forces.

This conflict assessment study helps formulate a series of recommendations:

- Work with Shehias level peace and security committees as well as interventions by District and Regional Commissioners to support the strengthening of sustainable conflict management.
- Engage with credible religious leaders trusted by both political sides to support the transformation of local and national conflicts in Zanzibar.
- Dedicate specific attention to Pemba and develop a significant part of the project activities in that island.
- Carefully plan, supervise and monitor activities in Pemba.
- Present project activities as peace-oriented and not focused on VE.
- Foster cross-party dialogue.
- Use dialogue opportunities to create grounds for sustainable peace in Zanzibar.
- Postpone mediation efforts until later project stages.
- Create unique interventions instead of one size fits all mechanisms.
- Mainstream disability in the project.
- Redefine media training techniques.
- Continue to give a central role to youth and women.

1. Background information

Context background

Tanzania is historically regarded as politically stable compared to other countries in East Africa. For example, the Global Terrorism Index in Tanzania decreased to 3.11 in 2019 from 3.27 in 2018.¹ Besides that, the global peace index indicates that Tanzania has positively improved six positions upward to become the 52nd country.² Yet, in the last seven years, the country has experienced occasional violent extremist incidents. In October 2020, for instance, southern parts of Tanzania witnessed attacks from proclaimed Islamic State-linked militants based in northern parts of Mozambique.³ This increased incidence of violent conflicts has been linked to various political, social and economic grievances. Despite the country being a multiparty democracy, the political system has been skewed in favour of the ruling party. This has led to dissatisfaction among many people and groups, who have been turning to more radical positions.⁴

This narrative is particularly true in the semi-autonomous archipelago of **Zanzibar**, which holds **ambitions for increased autonomy** and frequently chafes at the control exerted by the mainland government. Distrust between political parties and between government and communities has steadily increased, and numerous cases of election-related violence, a lack of reforms, and continued **socio-economic disparities** have contributed to the disillusionment of many in Zanzibar.⁵

The **2015 revocation of the election results** represents a particularly important moment, with all evidence indicating that it contributed significantly to increased distrust of elections bodies and the ruling government.⁶ On the island, the election was annulled after the opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF), had claimed victory for their presidential candidate before the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) announced the election's official results. After the cancellation of the election, ZEC called a re-run in March 2016, which was boycotted by CUF. This fiasco led to the end of the de facto reconciliation and unity government, which had been viewed as a road map for peace and unity among Zanzibaris after years of political enmity.⁷

Despite numerous calls for increased transparency in the electoral process and for meaningful reforms, the ruling party was perceived by the opposition to be making little effort to address these issues in time for the October 2020 elections. This has resulted in increased tensions between the ruling party (CCM) and the opposition party, The Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT)⁸.

Zanzibar's **October 2020 election** recalled the violence that followed the 2015 elections as well as the continued lack of reforms or transparency. The 2020 general election was specifically challenging as for the first time the Zanzibar election was held on two consecutive days. Many people were reluctant with that decision, but ZEC insisted that it follows the law as stated in Act number 4 of 2018. That decision led to clashes between supporters of the main opposition party and Zanzibar and

¹ Trading Economics, *Tanzania Terrorism Index*, <https://tradingeconomics.com/tanzania/terrorism-index>

² Institute for Economics & Peace, *Global Peace Index 2020*, https://visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/GPI_2020_web.pdf

³ AP, "Tanzania confirms 1st attack by Mozambique-based extremists", October 23, 2020, <https://apnews.com/article/dodoma-tanzania-islamic-state-group-mozambique-48d8c438da403810a8a11f869ecd97ca>

⁴ Sarota, A. Totoro, A. (2019), *Katika Usalama Tunategemeana and Pamoja!*, SFCG Projects evaluation February, 2019.

⁵ Freedom House, *Tanzania*, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tanzania/freedom-world/2021>

⁶ Yussuf, Mohammad and Hussein Sengu. "Conflict Analysis Paper" April, 2020.

⁷ Sarota, A. Totoro, A., *cit.*, 2019.

⁸ <https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/393576/tanzania-clashes-reported-as-early-voting-begins-in-zanzibar-october-27>

Tanzania security forces.⁹ The ACT party, which was the main opposition party in Zanzibar at that point, claimed that at least three of its supporters were killed by the Zanzibar Special Forces. The death of opposition supporters, as well as the death of one-armed military, caused high political tension and security concerns, especially on Pemba Island¹⁰. Though the GNU¹¹ has tremendously eased political tensions in Zanzibar, there are still concerns related to the sustainability of peace due to grievances and the need for retaliation from families and friends who lost their loved ones during the 2020 general elections.

In Zanzibar, the current **GNU**, which has been formed by the ruling party CCM and the main opposition political party in Zanzibar, the ACT Wazalendo political party, has enormously reshaped peace structures in the Isles. Currently, the President of Zanzibar and his two Vice Presidents (VPs); First VP from ACT party and Second VP from CCM are collectively working at the local and national level to reconcile peace after a number of violent outbreaks that happened before, during and after the 2020 general elections in Zanzibar.

The current **Zanzibar government structure** represents a new beginning for peace mechanisms. It has engaged government leaders from both main political parties working together to advance peace and development programs. Common citizens and political actors, as well as development partners, are all witnessing a Zanzibar that has opened doors for strengthening peace mechanisms, unity and general development in Unguja and Pemba Islands.

The national political scenario radically changed in **mid-March 2021** when Tanzania's President John Magufuli died. In line with Tanzania's constitution, the **Deputy President, Samia Suluhu Hassan, was sworn in as the new President** and would serve the remainder of Magufuli's five-year term, which he began in October 2020. Samia Suluhu Hassan is from Zanzibar, more specifically from the southern part of Unguja Island, and she has a background in the civil society sector. However, in 2000, she started her political career as a member of the House of Representatives and in 2014 she became nationally recognized as a competent public leader after being a deputy speaker for the special assembly working on Tanzania's new constitution.¹²

Notably, President Hassan said in April that she was ready to defend democracy and fundamental freedoms, adding that she would soon hold **talks with opposition leaders** in her first speech to Parliament broadcast by local media. This open approach to political opposition provides a remarkable opportunity to increase social cohesion in Zanzibar as much as in the whole country.¹³

Subsequently, the current **newly elected Zanzibar President Husein Mwinyi** has been publicly explaining his intention to reinstate the GNU in Zanzibar since his Presidential election campaigns. Soon after being declared a winner, he reaffirmed his commitment to the GNU and overall peace and development processes in Zanzibar¹⁴. The President of Zanzibar and his two Vice Presidents have been meeting with community members in Zanzibar and do a kind of "informal reconciliation process" after electoral aftermaths¹⁵. Their current "open arms" gesture has resulted in an influx of members of the international community to Zanzibar. For instance, after the 2015 general elections, a significant number of international development partners had cut off their ties with the Zanzibar government of which is contrary to the current period where the US, EU and other individual

⁹ Garda World, "Tanzania: Clashes reported as early voting begins in Zanzibar October 27", October 27, 2020, <https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/393576/tanzania-clashes-reported-as-early-voting-begins-in-zanzibar-october-27>

¹⁰ <https://www.voanews.com/africa/tanzanian-opposition-party-says-police-killed-7-ahead-vote>

¹¹ Nicodemus Minde, Sterling Roop and Kjetil Tronvoll, *The Rise and Fall of the Government of National Unit in Zanzibar*, 2018, <https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE17.1Minde.pdf>

¹² BBC, "Samia Suluhu Hassan - Tanzania's new president", March 19, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56444575>

¹³ Oduor, M., "Tanzania's President Suluhu reaches out to opposition", *Africanews*, April 23, 2021, <https://www.africanews.com/2021/04/23/tanzania-s-president-suluhu-reaches-out-to-opposition/>

¹⁴ Christopher Majaliwa, "Tanzania: GNU My Top Success Story – Mwinyi", *Tanzania Daily News (Dar es Salaam)*, February 9, 2021, <https://allafrica.com/stories/202102100235.html>

¹⁵ Daily News, "Seif tells Zanzibaries to Shun Political Hatred", January 4, 2021, <https://dailynews.co.tz/news/2021-01-035ff20a098ea85.aspx>

development partners have been visiting Zanzibar for reinstating their partnership with Zanzibar government and local communities in general¹⁶. President Mwinyi has represented President Samia Hassan in international meetings, i.e. SADC meetings in Mozambique, a move that did not happen during previous leadership under President John Magufuli¹⁷. **From her early speeches, President Hassan has shown interest to foster Zanzibar's current peace under GNU spirit.** All these activities indicate that the current Zanzibar President stands a good chance of progressing the current peace and development momentum under support from both President Samia Haasan and international development partners.

Project Background

The **project *Dumisha Amani Zanzibar*** ("Strengthening Community Peace Mechanisms in Zanzibar"), funded by the European Commission, intends to strengthen alternative peacebuilding mechanisms at the community level to de-escalate and peacefully resolve conflicts in Zanzibar, including both Pemba and Unguja.

In response to the Zanzibar context, Search structured the project based on the **theory of change (ToC)** that, *If trusted, community influencers have increased capacity and opportunities to support peaceful conflict transformation and dialogue at the local level and if they have platforms to constructively engage with government authorities and the wider community, then tensions and conflict issues in Zanzibar will be resolved peacefully because there will be strengthened trust and collaboration among diverse stakeholders.*

The action has three interrelated objectives and corresponding outcomes, as follows:

1. To increase the capacity of diverse communities, political, and civil society stakeholders to act as informal mediators and champions for peace in their communities.

Result 1.1 Key stakeholders in Zanzibar have increased knowledge and skills in conflict transformation and confidence in their abilities to use them.

2. To foster dialogue and collaboration among government and community stakeholders for improved conflict prevention.

Result 2.1 Increased multi-stakeholder platforms for community actors to peacefully discuss tensions and concerns.

Result 2.2 Collaborative initiatives to de-escalate tensions and prevent conflict are created and strengthened.

3. To increase community awareness of joint conflict-prevention efforts and avenues to peacefully address their concerns.

Result 3.1 Conflict prevention strategies and successes are transparently shared with the wider community.

¹⁶ USAID, *U.S. Ambassador Inaugurates New Zanzibar Public Health Emergency Operations Center*, May 19, 2021, <https://www.usaid.gov/tanzania/press-releases/may-19-2021-us-ambassador-inaugurates-new-zanzibar-public-health>

¹⁷ SADC, "Communiqué...", April 8, 2021, <https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/communique-extraordinary-double-troika-summit-heads-state-and-government-southern-african-development-community-maputo-republic/>

2. Methodology

2.1 Objectives

The overall purpose of this *Conflict Snapshot & Baseline Assessment* is to provide rapid insight into the conflict dynamics in the electoral conflict in general, and more specific to the post-election period. At the same time, the collected data for the project will facilitate target setting for each result indicator. In addition, the findings from the snapshot and baseline assessment will inform project design adjustment when necessary.

The specific objectives indicated in the TOR for the **conflict snapshot** are:

1. Probe on post-election violence events that occurred in the area and their effects on the community.
2. Explore the capacity of diverse communities, political, and civil society stakeholders to act as informal mediators and champions for peace in their communities.
3. Examine the existing platforms and collaborative initiatives for community actors to peacefully discuss conflict and de-escalate tensions and concerns.
4. Assess the extent of community awareness for and readiness to joint conflict-prevention efforts and avenues to peacefully address their concerns.
5. Examine the likelihood of the connections between election grievances and the development of VE activities, radicalization and recruitment of the security concerns to the study area.
6. Evaluate the risks of the project and make suggestions so that the principle of "do no harm" is respected by the activities of the project.

While the tied objectives indicated in the TORs for the **baseline** are:

1. To assess the validity of the theory of change, the general objective and the expected results of the project.
2. To collect the baseline values of the project results indicators.
3. To provide recommendations for the project execution strategy in reflection to intended project results.

2.2 Data collection and analysis

Data collection was carried out by the Agency for Peacebuilding (AP) with the support of *Search's* Tanzania team. This study used a mixed approach that combines qualitative and quantitative data collection methods.


Quantitative tools included a survey conducted among local communities (419 respondents) and a survey with local stakeholders and government (51 respondents) after the FGDs or the KIIs.

The community survey involved two enumerators, one in Pemba and one Unguja. They collected data in several different public spaces on both islands from 7th to 13th May 2021.


In the **community survey**, the distribution of respondents by age, sex and geographic coverage was balanced and consistent with population data, as indicated in the table below. Overall, from a statistical perspective, the community survey guarantees a 95% confidence level and a margin of error below 5% (calculated with a population of 1,5 million inhabitants).

Table 1 Community survey						
Sex	Age			Location		
	Youth (18-34)	Adults (35-49)	Above 50	Pemba	Unguja	Total
Female	50.59%	40.00%	44.44%	48.61%	45.32%	47.02%
Male	49.41%	60.00%	55.56%	51.39%	54.68%	52.98%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

The community survey has therefore covered both Pemba and Unguja. In Pemba, the team collected 216 (51.55%) responses, while in Unguja 203 (48.45%). Below the details of the respondents for each district.



The survey captured high diversity in terms of educational level and employment status. These data, among others, enriched the report's analysis and identified several patterns.



The **stakeholders' survey** reached 51 respondents from different groups: religious leaders, civil society organizations, farmers, businesspersons, media, youth leaders and public officers (full list in the Annexes). Below the respondents disaggregated by age, sex and geographic coverage. This survey allows some quantitative analysis as requested by the indicator. To compare the data during the final evaluation, the researchers can use the same list of stakeholders (or most of it, if some of them will not be available).

Sex	Age			Location		
	18-29	30-49	Above 50	Pemba	Unguja	Total
Female	41,38%	25,00%	20,00%	27,78%	36,36%	33,33%
Male	58,62%	75,00%	80,00%	72,22%	63,64%	66,67%
Total	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%

The qualitative tools consisted of **Key Informative Interviews (KIIs)** and **Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)**. The team conducted 10 KIIs (seven men and three women) both in Pemba and Unguja with women's and youth associations, religious leaders, local leaders, local authorities and Search's staff in both Zanzibar and mainland. The interviews were conducted in person (6) and by video call (4). FGDs involved five distinct groups, as presented below.

Category	Location	N. of part.	Female	Male
Local leaders and political parties' youth wings	Unguja	10	7	3
Local leaders and political parties' youth wings	Unguja	10	5	5
Female youth group	Unguja	10	10	0
Community leaders	Pemba	10	3	7
Mixed group	Pemba	9	4	5
Total		49	29	20

2.3 Challenges and limitations

Due to the excellent support of Search's team in Zanzibar and in the whole Swahili Coast region, the exercise encountered only limited challenges and limitations. A couple of minor issues could be mentioned. Firstly, during the inception phase, AP's team and Search had a slower pace of responses in terms of selecting specific areas in both Unguja and Pemba Islands for conducting the baseline and conflict snapshot exercise. Secondly, the timeframe for the entire baseline exercise was somewhat short; therefore, the activities were undertaken with consideration to the limitation of time.

Thirdly, a number of respondents were hardly able to provide detailed responses despite various probing techniques. This happened more in Pemba Island as respondents, like the case for most community members in Pemba, still reserving their trusts to private and public institutions due to fear of possible repercussions. This is because of cultural and traditional practices that common Zanzibaris (especially those living in small Islands and remote areas) have when it comes to speaking in public. They are always shy to speak up instantly but often open up in later conversation stages. For instance, FDGs in Pemba were calm at the beginning of the discussion, making the enumerator use different techniques to let them speak, but later on, they spoke comfortably after feeling confident with meeting settings.

Finally, the local government has established some constraints to the discussions and research on violent extremisms. This attitude could have affected the freedom of sharing information from some respondents in the VE domain. Overall, these limitations did not affect the quality of findings significantly.

3. Research findings

The key findings of the study are organized around six sections following the main objectives of this exercise: electoral violence, capacity of stakeholders to act as informal mediators and champions for peace, existing platforms and collaborative initiatives to de-escalate tensions, community awareness and readiness to joint conflict-prevention efforts, election grievances and the development of radicalization and recruitment and risks to the project.

1. Electoral violence

Qualitative data collected through interviews and focus groups show that most respondents were witnesses of electoral-related violence both In Pemba and Unguja. Two CSOs, Zanzibar Fighting Against Youth Challenges Organization (ZAFAYCO) and *Jumuiya ya Wanawake wenye Ulemavu Zanzibar* (JUWAUZA - Organization of Women with Disabilities in Zanzibar), have also drafted election reports that describe violent incidents that the organizations saw during the 2020 elections and provided recommendations for peaceful future elections in Zanzibar¹⁸. As described in the report, **the polarized political environment facilitated the spread of violence** during and after the electoral period: "The polls took place in an environment of suspicion and mistrust caused by long-standing unresolved division among political stakeholders. This polarization manifests itself in the form of political support, identity crisis and economic imbalance between the people of the two main islands forming Zanzibar (i.e., Unguja and Pemba)."¹⁹ This cleavage between the two islands is politically grounded, as shown by the data collection and by the literature review, but also presents socio-economic consequences²⁰.

Regarding **Pemba Island**, during a KII, a media representative stated that he wrote an article explaining the death of people and the damage to properties that happened in Zanzibar: "I reported the death of 11, one of them left eight orphans in Pemba." He continued: "As police were publicly reporting fewer cases, due to my article, I received several threatening calls from Police and Zanzibar Special Forces, both institutions I asked them to prove me wrong and they couldn't." Other journalists refer to "Mazombies," a word combining the words "Mask and Zombies." It refers to the Secret agents sent by the government undercover to pose a threat to a certain group of people. Another respondent mentioned that "At Micheweni District, community members reached a level of fighting with each other with machetes."

Concerning **Unguja**, a religious leader from Kinuni shehia (neighborhood in Unguja town's suburbs) confirmed during an interview that violence occurred in that community. Kinuni shehia has, for many election years, witnessed the presence of Zanzibar security forces before, during and immediately after general elections. This tendency has sometimes led to clashes between security agents and Kinuni residents. He also added that opposition political parties' leaders sometimes order their followers to conduct some actions that are unlawful during the elections, hence the violence between police and some opposition parties' members occurs.

In an interview with a CSO representative, it was mentioned that during the night leading up to the election, some of the elections centres were surrounded by opposition members, especially youths claiming that they were there to protect the entering of ballot papers and thus caused the

¹⁸ Organization of Women with Disabilities in Zanzibar (JUWAUZA), Report on the 2020 Citizen Election Observation in Zanzibar, January 2021, https://juwauza.or.tz/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Citizen-Observation_Eng.pdf

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 1.

²⁰ As described in JUWAUZA's report (p. 4), "To many Zanzibaris an increasing gap in income earning is seen as generating economic imbalance between two sides of the Union. This has caused some Zanzibaris, especially the opposition, to call for more autonomy for the isles while the ruling party protects the existing structure."

security forces of those centres to chase them away by using tear gases which escalated violent clashes²¹.


Overall, the collected data confirmed the violence reported by JUWAUZA's observation mission: "the 2020 general elections were held amidst the presence of indications of small-scale attacks related to violence. The rising number of attacks against domestic targets, including attacks on public properties and individual civilians, are presumed to be politically motivated."²²

Against this backdrop, it seems more pertinent to adopt the expression "electoral violence" more than "post-electoral violence." This accuracy can help to read and interpret both the violence occurring during the vote and the structural issues and constraints imposed in the pre-vote phase.

2. Capacity of stakeholders to act as informal mediators and champions for peace

Both qualitative and quantitative data show that there is a **perceived huge capacity of different stakeholders, but also community members, to act as informal mediators and champions for peace** in their communities. At the community level, approximately 2/3 of the Zanzibarian population consider him/herself as a community influencer, at least "mostly."

This is a very high number and this perception can be interpreted as a widespread availability, and partially also will, among the citizens to influence their community. This trend does not seem significantly different in Pemba and Unguja (figure below). Similarly, female and male citizens present similar self-perceptions with slight male predominance (60% of women and 70% of men consider themselves as community influencers).



Quantitative analysis also shows that approximately **2/3 of the Zanzibarian population, both male and female, use "conflict transformation or similar non-violent strategies."** In this regard, a gender difference emerges in which domain male and female citizens apply these strategies. Qualitative data show that the female component is mainly engaged at the domestic level, while the male citizens are more at the social and political level. For instance, a female participant shared: "I was taking part to solve this conflict among the people with disabilities and political leaders." Another from the same group mentioned that he solved the conflict between students and shaha. In geographic terms,


Furthermore, on the post-electoral tensions, **42% of the overall population responded that they had the opportunity to discuss or address those tensions.** In this field, the percentage of female respondents is lower (31.28%) than that of male respondents (51.36%). This data confirms that women are less engaged in public issues. These findings were confirmed by different respondents during focus group discussions. Yet, in absolute terms, almost one female citizen out of three engaged in addressing post-electoral tensions remains significant data for the implementation of this project.

Finally, during the interviews and focus groups discussions, several respondents mentioned that,

²¹ AlJazeera, "Zanzibar: Opposition claims 9 killed, leader held ahead of polls", October 27, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/27/zanzibar-opposition-say-leader-held-three-dead-ahead-of-polls>

²² JUWAUZA, cit., p. 5.

in the last months, the political authorities are more open to dialogue. For instance, senior government leaders (President and his VPs) visit main community mosques every Friday and speak with community members regarding the importance of maintaining peace²³. These activities are being conducted especially in communities that have tensions among themselves or against the governments. Different informants say that the practice is believed to be working well so far.



These activities are interpreted by an informant as "a type of informal reconciliation process to communities with political tensions"

such as the Darajobovu area in Unguja and Wete town in Pemba. This analysis is echoed, for instance, by a CSO representative that highlighted how the First Vice President of Zanzibar, Late Maalim Seif Sharif Hamad presented a number of speeches aiming at enhancing unity after the 2020 general elections no matter what happened during the election period²⁴. Furthermore, the current Zanzibar President voiced continuous calls for collaboration with opposition leaders and among local communities in Zanzibar.

Notably, a youth leader in Pemba declared in an interview that he "see GNU helping to bring people together hence strengthening peace among Zanzibar communities." Notably, during the same interview he showed that he was skeptical toward the government, for instance saying that "government leaders are biased and mostly busy with their individual interests," showing a change of perception related to the recent political development at governmental level.

Overall, a significant part of the respondents recognizes that the GNU is among the great efforts toward a peaceful approach to conflict-prevention. At the same time, some of them, especially in Pemba, underlined that the governmental level is still far from the grassroots level.

These data are confirmed by the community survey. In fact, the data show that **in March-April 2021 half of the population experienced more space for political dialogue** and to address tensions.

This space is experienced more in Unguja (68.06%) than in Pemba (55.17%). This means that the new leaderships both at Tanzania and Zanzibar levels have not been able to fully involve Pemba Island in the new course. Interestingly enough, adults (72.73%) and elderly (74.07%) experience it more than youth (54.51%). This means that youth are less involved in these new activities to descalate tensions than older people (figures below).

²³ Daily News, "Mwinyi tells People to Solve People Problems", March 15, 2021, <https://www.dailynews.co.tz/news/2021-03-14604e385ac1920.aspx>

²⁴ Daily News, Jan. 4, 2021, cit.

Fig. 6 More space for political dialogue and to address tensions in the last two months (location)





Fig. 7 More space for political dialogue and to address tensions in the last two months (age)




3. Existing platforms and collaborative initiatives to de-escalate tensions

The majority of the population in Zanzibar considers **different collaborative forums as useful to de-escalate tensions** (see figure below). These platforms or other joint initiatives therefore represent an opportunity to strengthen social cohesion and conflict transformation mechanisms.

Interestingly, there are no significant discrepancies on this opinion between Pemba and Unguja and along age lines (both less than 5%), while gender divergences are in place (68.92% of men and 53.81% of women believe that collaborative forums de-escalate tension). This data could be due to the predominant domestic female sphere of engaging in conflicts as discussed in other sections, and to mainly male forums.

Fig. 8 Do you think that collaborative forums de-escalate tensions?



Local community meetings at shehia levels, shehia peace and security committees, mosque committees were mentioned during the interviews as collaborative forums to resolve disputes and misunderstanding among the community members.


Mentioned organizations working on descalating conflicts include: Zanzibar Fighting Against Youth Challenges Organization (ZAFAYCO), Center for Youth Dialogue (CYD), Jumuiya ya Maimamu Zanzibar (JUMAZA) were mentioned by different respondents.²⁵ The GNU and the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) are also frequently mentioned as contributing to resolving

²⁵ Other organizations mentioned during the FGDs include: Association of Muslim Leaders (JUMAZA), Zanzibar Legal Services Centre (ZLSC), Zanzibar Aid Commission (ZAC), Mufti Office in Zanzibar (MOZ), Global Peace Foundation, Jongowe Development Fund, Zanzibar Youth Forum, Pamoja Youth Initiative, TAMWA, Center for Youth Dialogue, ZAFELA, Mufti Office in Zanzibar, Anglican Church, Zanzibar Legal Services Centre and Legal Aid Department. ZBC radio and TV were mentioned during a FGD in Pemba.

conflicts, especially by Unguja respondents.


The community survey also presented a specific question, whereby it asked **if the respondent has heard of Search before. Only 7.88% responded positively** (5.58% among women, 9.91% among men; 3.24% in Pemba, 12.81% in Unguja). This aspect should be considered in planning the project activities, especially on reaching out to communities and stakeholders.

Finally, due to the fact that religious leaders have been mentioned as relevant stakeholders by different respondents, it is important to mention that the population survey shows that **religious differences** are not considered a limitation to address tensions (figure on the right).



The majority of respondents agreed that **religious difference has less or no significant impact against the ability to address tensions**. It should be clarified that Zanzibar residents who are approximately 98% Muslim according to a US government estimate, of whom two-thirds are Sunni, according to a 2012 Pew Forum report. The remainder consists of several Shia groups, mostly of Asian descent²⁶.

Therefore, there is wider room for Muslim leaders and Islamic religious believers to use religious teachings and other resources (i.e., Mosques, madrassas and other religious gatherings) to reduce social and political tensions in Zanzibar.



However, this project should also consider responses from a few respondents who showed concerns regarding intra-religious conflicts among Muslims and versus the Christian minority.


4. Community awareness and readiness to joint conflict-prevention efforts

The analysis shows that the **collaboration between the two main political parties in Zanzibar** is still complex. In fact, several informants shared that the main divisive line in the islands is between two main political parties (CCM and ACT). A respondent from Pemba mentioned that, "though there is growing socialization between political parties' supporters especially at national


²⁶"Tanzania 2018 International Religious Freedom Report", <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/TANZANIA-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf>

levels, still there is high tension in some parts of northern Pemba due to resentments from previous election related violent incidents that caused loss of some family members." The survey shows that more than 40% of local citizens do not engage in dialogue with other people from other groups (e.g., supporters of the other political party).

However, as the table below shows, **the largest majority of respondents (86.3%) see the collaboration to address issues emerging during the electoral period as important.** These data show once again that an open attitude is currently present in the population, despite the difficulties and divisions related to the political system.



The interviews show several examples of efforts done by community and security leaders to respond to post-election violent events, like providing training programs. Some respondents mentioned CSOs peace dialogues (i.e., ZAFAYCO and CYD) urging community members to maintain peace despite electoral violence incidents that happened during the 2020 general elections. The Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition that had initiated a cause to ask for those who were put in custody during the 2020 general elections to be released was also mentioned. Additionally, ACT political party joining the CCM to form the GNU is considered by several informants as a peaceful path. Notably, a few respondents highlighted that top-level dialogue does not mean that dialogue and mutual understanding are also present at grassroots level.



When it comes to the **role of women**, the FGDs and KIIls showed a main tendency to present the role of women in the domestic space. Women's role for peace is recognized by all, but often relegated to "bringing up the children into good behaviours and morals", or, as shared by a respondent, "women play a big role, for instance, in informing husbands on consequences for wrongly engaging in protesting the early voting exercise." Some respondents mentioned that women could help to resolve political issues, but they have limited room to help with social conflicts due to traditional and religious teachings regarding women's space in communities.

Overall, women's space has improved in the last year, but traditional constraints remain for a public engagement in the public space. As a respondent said during a focus group: "women have the power to keep and maintain peace in our country, but they are not given a chance." At the same time, Gender-Based Violence (GBV) remains present and it was mentioned that it also causes conflicts in the community. Rule and behaviours related to divorce and other family issues were also often mentioned as causes of divisions and tensions.

Against this backdrop, the special seats for women at the Parliament represent an important public space for political participation. The career of the current Tanzanian President also benefited from this opportunity.

Finally, it deserves to be noted that in January 2021, President Mwinyi directed the creation of **special courts dedicated to tackle gender-based violence (GBV) in Zanzibar**. He launched this initiative during his public meeting with government and non-government stakeholders against GBV matters in the Isles. In his speech, President Mwinyi said that, "This (GBV) problem is huge and it is a great shame to the country."²⁷ Following his order, in early February 2021, courts established to tackle women and child abuse cases in Zanzibar. Within one month after its establishment, more than 150 cases were quickly registered in both Unguja and Pemba Islands²⁸.

5 Election grievances and the development of radicalization and recruitment

The data collected have not shown an emerging correlation between election grievances and violent extremism, including some cases of development of radicalization and recruitment. However, it should be highlighted that **there is a general security practice by the Tanzania government to not publicly report or entertain discussions surrounding violent extremism**. This practice could bias the data collection in this field. Even with attack incidents like those that happened on the southern border of Tanzania, the government made deliberate actions not to amplify the extremist actions and impacts. Yet, UAMSHO, a popular shorthand for *The Association for Islamic Mobilisation and Propagation*, was mentioned by some respondents during the FGDs as a potential threat.

Also, there is limited knowledge among community members on understanding early warning signs and elements of recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism. For instance, most community members could not relate crimes and cross border challenges, but one would understand that when youth commit crimes in Wete district in Pemba, they sometimes run away to neighbouring countries like Kenya through Mombasa coast. That practice sometimes lets them arrive in Kenya and be involved in recruitment and violent extremism.

Communities in Zanzibar are highly polarised based on political affiliations. This practice makes it easier for security agencies and other political actors to claim that violent incidents are being done by opposition members hence losing an opportunity to better understand trends of violent incidents and their impact levels, including possible radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism. Therefore, most community members link all kinds of violence to political affiliation, ethnicity, personal attitudes and gender-based violence (GBV) aspects.

Overall, according to government statistics collected from the police, about 1,091 abuse and violence-related incidents were reported to various police stations in Unguja and Pemba in 2017/2018, compared to 2,449 incidents that were reported in 2016/2017. Meanwhile, in 2019 a total of 941 abuse cases were reported across Zanzibar regions, marking a 150 decreased number of cases compared to those figures reported in 2018²⁹. Among factors for reduced reported cases include the corruption incidents that makes the case fail in court or face deliberate delayed judgements. Community stigmatization, family relations between victims and perpetrators, cultural norms as well as inadequate knowledge to protect violence evidence has also been leading factors for a decrease in reporting abuse cases in Zanzibar. The fight against child abuse has also been

²⁷ Daily News, "Sexual Abuses Cannot be Tolerated", January 9, 2021, <https://www.dailynews.co.tz/news/2021-01-085ff886e027836.aspx>

²⁸ 94 were registered at Vuga court, 26 at Mahonda court, 21 at Mwera court in Unguja; 10 cases were registered at Chake Chake court and 2 at Wete court in Pemba. Source: <https://www.ippmedia.com/en/features/special-sexual-offences-court-intensifies%C2%A0anti-gbv-battle-isles>

²⁹ Daily News, "Rape, Sexual Violence Prompt Great Concerns in Zanzibar", January 29, 2020, <https://dailynews.co.tz/news/2020-01-285e30459243fa0.aspx>

fought by a previous President of Zanzibar, Ali Mohamed Shein, who, since his early days in office, has established Ministerial level (cabinet) committee for fighting child abuse. During his speech on the 56th celebration of *Mapinduzi* Day (anniversary of Zanzibar Revolution), which was his last as a President of Zanzibar after 10 years in office, Dr. Shein said, "It is a shame for our country to continue recording sexual abuse and other offences against vulnerable groups."³⁰

6. Risks to the project

A peacebuilding project focused on Zanzibar has a potentially high impact, but it also presents challenges and risks that should be carefully considered.

The **main conflict in Zanzibar is between the two main political parties (CCM and ACT)**³¹. CCM commands massive support in Unguja, while the opposition (ACT-Wazalendo) holds a strong base in Pemba. The work with political members is an important component of the project, and it can benefit from important spaces for dialogue in the coming months due to the different circumstances presented above. At the same time, the political field remains highly divisive and this issue should inform all the actions. Some areas in particular can create tension, such as the reform of the electoral law.

Furthermore, the **tensions between Pemba and Unguja are high**. The quantitative data disaggregated by geographic areas show that the population on the island of Pemba appears with less awareness and readiness to joint conflict-prevention efforts and avenues to address their concerns compared to Unguja peacefully. This could be due to several factors. It seems, for instance, that they receive less training in conflict transformation or similar activities. This gap should not be further amplified by the project.

In addition, **while Pemba deserves attention by peacebuilding projects, the government of Zanzibar would not fully approve increased attention because it is an "opposition stronghold"**. For this reason, Search should liaise with shehas, discuss how to involve local people, involve the media and maintain the supervision of the full process.

The project can also present **risks that some activities would not be approved by the local government**. In fact, it should be noted how shehas' roles has been elevated by the Zanzibar Local Government Authority Act, No.7/2014 which ordered that any community gathering should have respective Sheha's approval³². This means that, apart from gatherings in Mosques and Churches, all other social and political gatherings should have Sheha's blessing in order to take place. This rule gives sheha and his shehia committees a critical role to be considered when designing interventions.

Moreover, **the Tanzania government does not publicly report or entertain discussions surrounding violent extremism**. If Search will address violent extremism directly and publicly, this move can occur in the risk of tensions with institutional authorities and to halt the activities. Search should therefore address issues from a peacebuilding perspective and terminology, avoiding direct public reference to violent extremism and recruitment.

From a gender perspective, it seems that **some women or women groups could be excluded if they do not have a safe space** (e.g., for females only) to participate. This is due to many social factors including cultural norms that women do not speak in front of their elders especially the males. Therefore, if not given safe space, women could be only dragged by the interests or priorities of males. This project should therefore design interventions that often provide ample

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ ACT-Wazalendo gained strength after the Civic United Front (CUF), formerly a powerful group in Zanzibar since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1992, experienced an internal conflict that resulted in its split. CFU has remained a small party, while the splinter group joined ACT-Wazalendo, which is regarded by many as a potential opposition force

³² Zanzibar Local Government, Act No.7/2014, http://www.zanzibarassembly.go.tz/act_2014/act_7.pdf

space for women and girls to express their views, take lessons or implement their activities among themselves.

As presented in JUWAUZA's report, **groups with disabilities encounter severe difficulties in social and political life**. For instance, groups of people with disabilities had limited access to campaign rallies and the designated parking lots were distant for them. Groups with disability are often indirect victims of violence because they cannot easily escape from violent conflicts such as during the electoral period. Search should avoid the risk of creating direct and indirect barriers to people with disabilities in all its activities, also in consultation with specialized organizations like JUWAUZA.

Other risks and tensions mentioned during the KIIs and FGDs are **human rights conflicts between citizens and especially Zanzibar special forces**. Limited faith with police, court and government due to UAMSHO cases, land conflicts, and conflict between the government and the businessmen at Darajani.

<i>Table 4 Project risks</i>			
Potential risk	Probability	Risk rating	Mitigation
Discussion on the electoral law	Medium	Medium	Avoid public discussions on the lectora note, but engage the stakeholders in a close-doors setting.
Pemba island receives less attention (e.g. training) by the project activities than Unguja	High	Low	Plan specific and regular activities in Pemba.
Government does not approve some project activities	Medium	Medium	Respect all the procedures with shehas to obtain the necessary authorizations for public activities.
Search's activities on VE are halted	Medium	High	Address issues from a peacebuilding perspective and terminology, avoiding direct public reference to violent extremism and recruitment.
Women or women groups are partially marginalized	High	Low	Design interventions that often provide ample space for women and girls to express their views, take lessons or implement their activities among themselves.
Groups with disabilities encounter difficulties to participate	High	Low	Avoid the risk to create direct and indirect barrier to disables in all its activities, also in consultation with specialized organizations

Table 6 Opportunities to discuss or address post-election and broader community tensions (location)												
Location of the survey	Pemba - Chake Chake	Pemba - Micheweni	Pemba - Mkoani	Pemba - Wete	Unguja-Central	Unguja-North A	Unguja-North B	Unguja-Unguja South	Unguja-Urban	Unguja-West A	Unguja-West B	Total
Definitely yes	13,70%	6,52%	10,61%	13,33%	4,17%	10,00%	15,00%	11,76%	32,35%	6,67%	21,62%	13,19%
Mostly yes	31,51%	28,26%	24,24%	40,00%	37,50%	15,00%	45,00%	35,29%	20,59%	26,67%	29,73%	28,78%
Mostly not	19,18%	52,17%	18,18%	26,67%	37,50%	35,00%	25,00%	29,41%	23,53%	40,00%	32,43%	29,50%
Not at all	35,62%	10,87%	46,97%	16,67%	20,83%	32,50%	5,00%	23,53%	23,53%	23,33%	13,51%	26,38%
I don't know/ I am not sure	0,00%	2,17%	0,00%	3,33%	0,00%	7,50%	10,00%	0,00%	0,00%	3,33%	2,70%	2,16%
Total	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%

These data show that 41.92% of the overall population responded that they had the opportunity to discuss or address those tensions. It should be noted that the percentage of female respondents is lower (31.28%) than that of male respondents (51.36%). These data confirm that women are less engaged in public issues, as also shown by other indicators. These data are confirmed by different respondents at the focus group discussions. Qualitative data also show that the women are engaged in conflict transformation mainly at the domestic level. Yet, in absolute terms, almost one female citizen out of three engaged in addressing post-electoral tensions remains significant data for the implementation of this project.

→ **Outcome - SO1:** Increase capacity of diverse community, government, and civil society stakeholders to act as informal mediators and champions for peace in their communities.

Indicator: % of targeted community influencers who feel confident to act as informal mediators (survey with stakeholder)

Question: Do you act as an informal mediator in your community?

Table 7 Community influencers acting as informal mediators (sex, age, location)				
	Sex	Age	Location	Total

	Female	Male	18-29	30-49	Above 50	Pemba	Unguja	
Always	11,76%	29,41%	13,79%	33,33%	40,00%	44,44%	12,12%	23,53%
Regularly	23,53%	26,47%	17,24%	16,67%	60,00%	38,89%	18,18%	25,49%
Only in rare occasions	35,29%	20,59%	34,48%	25,00%	0,00%	11,11%	33,33%	25,49%
Never	17,65%	8,82%	17,24%	8,33%	0,00%	5,56%	15,15%	11,76%
I don't know/ I am not sure	11,76%	14,71%	17,24%	16,67%	0,00%	0,00%	21,21%	13,73%
Total	100,00%							

These data show that a large part of the stakeholders engaged during the survey is already active as informal mediators (49.02%). As for the previous indicator, the percentage of women is smaller (35.29%) compared to men (55.88%). Interestingly, the numbers in Pemba are higher than in Unguja. FGDs confirm that several stakeholders had experiences in informal mediation.

Indicator: % of targeted community, government and civil society stakeholders who report increasing their use of non-violent conflict transformation strategies (survey with stakeholder)

Question: *Do you use conflict transformation or similar non-violent strategies?*

	Sex		Age			Location		Total
	Female	Male	18-29	30-49	Above 50	Pemba	Unguja	
Always	35,29%	35,29%	17,24%	41,67%	80,00%	72,22%	15,15%	35,29%
Regularly	11,76%	17,65%	17,24%	8,33%	20,00%	11,11%	18,18%	15,69%

Only in rare occasions	23,53%	14,71%	31,03%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	27,27%	17,65%
Never	23,53%	11,76%	17,24%	25,00%	0,00%	5,56%	21,21%	15,69%
I don't know/ I am not sure	5,88%	20,59%	17,24%	25,00%	0,00%	11,11%	18,18%	15,69%
Total	100,00%							

These data show that 50.98% of the stakeholders engaged during the survey use conflict transformation or similar non-violent strategies regularly. Here the difference between male and female respondents is minimal. Qualitative data indicate that the difference is mainly on *where* these strategies are applied (social/political sphere vs domestic), as already presented for other indicators. The numbers in Pemba are higher than in Unguja, confirming the trend on the previous indicator that is clearly connected to this one.

→ **Outcome - SO2:** Foster dialogue and collaboration among diverse government and community stakeholders for improved conflict prevention

Indicator: % of targeted community and political stakeholders who demonstrate increased engagement in dialogue and collaboration with stakeholders from another group (survey with stakeholder).

Question: Do you engage in dialogue or collaboration with people from another group?

<i>Table 9 Stakeholders engaging in dialogue or collaboration with people from another group (sex, age, location)</i>								
	Sex		Age			Location		Total
	Female	Male	18-29	30-49	Above 50	Pemba	Unguja	
Always	27,27%	38,10%	29,17%	33,33%	100,00%	62,50%	25,00%	34,38%
Regularly	18,18%	28,57%	25,00%	33,33%	0,00%	12,50%	29,17%	25,00%
Only in rare occasions	27,27%	19,05%	20,83%	33,33%	0,00%	25,00%	20,83%	21,88%

Table 12 Community members that that heard of community stakeholders collaborating for peace during the election period (location)

Location of the survey	Pemba - Chake Chake	Pemba - Micheweni	Pemba - Mkoani	Pemba - Wete	Unguja-Central	Unguja-North A	Unguja-North B	Unguja-Unguja South	Unguja-Urban	Unguja-West A	Unguja-West B	Total
Always	52,05%	10,87%	21,21%	50,00%	25,00%	12,50%	15,00%	23,53%	41,18%	13,33%	16,22%	27,34%
Regularly	38,36%	52,17%	57,58%	30,00%	37,50%	55,00%	50,00%	47,06%	29,41%	26,67%	54,05%	44,60%
Only in rare occasions	2,74%	28,26%	13,64%	16,67%	29,17%	17,50%	15,00%	23,53%	17,65%	43,33%	18,92%	18,23%
Never	2,74%	8,70%	4,55%	0,00%	8,33%	15,00%	20,00%	5,88%	11,76%	13,33%	5,41%	7,67%
I don't know/ I am not sure	4,11%	0,00%	3,03%	3,33%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	3,33%	5,41%	2,16%
Total	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%

These data show that 71.81% of the stakeholders heard of community stakeholders collaborating for peace during the election period. This awareness is similar along age lines and among female (73.84%) and male respondents (70%). Qualitative data confirmed that the respondents had in mind several examples of these collaborations. Geographically, this indicator shows a stronger attention by Pemba's stakeholders (79.16%) than Unguja's (64.04%). Instead, age does not present significant differences.

→ **Outputs - ER1.1** Key stakeholders in Zanzibar have increased knowledge and skills in conflict transformation

Indicator: % of targeted stakeholders who can provide at least one concrete example of skills used in conflict transformation (survey with stakeholder)

Question: Can you mention at least one concrete example of skills used in conflict transformation?

Table 13 Stakeholders that can mention at least one concrete example of skills used in conflict transformation (sex, age, location)

	Sex		Age			Location		Total
	Female	Male	18-29	30-49	Above 50	Pemba	Unguja	
Yes	41,18%	61,76%	41,38%	58,33%	90,00%	72,22%	45,45%	54,90%
No	47,06%	29,41%	44,83%	33,33%	10,00%	27,78%	39,39%	35,29%
I don't know	11,76%	8,82%	13,79%	8,33%	0,00%	0,00%	15,15%	9,80%
Total	100,00%							

This indicator points out that 54.9% of the stakeholders involved can mention at least one concrete example of skills used in conflict transformation. The understanding of conflict transformation is therefore concrete, but it should be noted that especially women seem to lack skills and knowledge of conflict transformation (41.18% of positive answers compared to 61.76% among men). Finally, Pemba's stakeholders confirm their skills and interest in conflict transformation.

The respondents also provided several different concrete examples, as reported in this list:

- Problem solving skill
- I put them together on both sides of the conflict and advised them to agree on a solution and let their differences become one
- To search the problem
- Sharing ideas
- Providing knowledge about interfaith relations and peace building
- Dialogue (*four times*)
- Mediation where two people or parties settled together to reach solution
- Good communication and team work
- Ability of being aware of and respect differences
- Listing from two sides of family members before gathering them together.
- Educating opponents on their rights before mediation
- Preparing airtime for community leaders to address measures taken on solving problems
- Door to door visit during election period

Table 15 Community members that can have heard of the Road Maps for Peace and/or Zanzibar Conference (location)

Location of the survey	Pemba - Chake Chake	Pemba - Micheweni	Pemba - Mkoani	Pemba - Wete	Unguja-Central	Unguja-North A	Unguja-North B	Unguja-Unguja South	Unguja-Urban	Unguja-West A	Unguja-West B	Total
No	24,66%	80,43%	9,09%	23,33%	41,67%	55,00%	40,00%	58,82%	38,24%	50,00%	45,95%	39,09%
Yes	17,81%	6,52%	57,58%	33,33%	25,00%	32,50%	40,00%	17,65%	44,12%	30,00%	43,24%	32,13%
I don't know/ I am not sure	57,53%	13,04%	33,33%	43,33%	33,33%	12,50%	20,00%	23,53%	17,65%	20,00%	10,81%	28,78%
Total	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%

This indicator simply shows that 32.05% of community members have heard of the Road Maps for Peace or Zanzibar Conference. The positive respondents are slightly higher among women and slightly higher in Unguja (34.48%) than in Pemba (29.63). This last information could highlight that, notwithstanding the interest in conflict transformation present in Pemba, the citizens are less connected to peace initiatives.

Table 16 Baseline indicators

Indicator	Baseline (May 2021)	Pemba	Unguja	Target
<i>% of community members surveyed who believe that they have opportunities to discuss/address post-election and broader community tensions</i>	41.92%	41.20%	43.35%	60%
<i>% of targeted community influencers who feel confident to act as informal mediators</i>	49.02%	83.33%	30.3%	80%
<i>% of targeted community, government and civil society stakeholders who report increasing their use of non-violent conflict transformation strategies</i>	50.98%	83.33%	33.33%	To be determined during baseline

<p><i>% of targeted community and political stakeholders who demonstrate increased engagement in dialogue and collaboration with stakeholders from another group</i></p>	59.38%	75%	54.7%	80%
<p><i>% of targeted community, and government stakeholders who see value in collaboration to address issues emerging during the electoral period.</i></p>	64.28%	100%	52.39%	80%
<p><i>% of community members who demonstrate awareness of community stakeholders collaborating for peace during the election period</i></p>	71.81%	79.16%	64.04%	To be determined after baseline
<p><i>% of targeted stakeholders who can provide at least one concrete example of skills used in conflict transformation</i></p>	Yes 54.90%	Yes 72.22%	Yes 45.45%	80%
<p><i>% of community members surveyed who report awareness of the Road Maps for Peace and/or Zanzibar Conference</i></p>	Yes 39.52%	Yes 29.63%	Yes 39.14%	

6. Conclusions and recommendations

This conflict assessment study helps formulate a series of recommendations mainly for SFCG and its partners that can contribute to them not undermining principles of Do No Harm and support the peace process in the region effectively.

- **Work with Shehias level peace and security committees as well as interventions by District and Regional Commissioners to support the strengthening of sustainable conflict management.** These bodies are mainly using top-down approaches that do not always provide ample time and room for deeper understanding of conflicting parties. Since shehias' roles has been elevated by the Zanzibar Local Government Authority Act, No.7/2014 which ordered that any community gathering should have respective Sheha's approval, the project should find entry points to strengthen shehia structures for more accountability, transparency and neutrality.
- **Engage with credible religious leaders trusted by both political sides** to support the transformation of local and national conflicts in Zanzibar. Search has already a solid experience in working with religious leaders. For this project, Search should select leaders who are trusted by both political sides and engage primarily with them. Both Islamic and Christian religions have shown significance in terms of influencing peace. The project should provide activities that will be utilized by religious leaders to accelerate peace messages. For instance, the project may facilitate engagement of community radios and local cable televisions by credible religious leaders to reach out to a wider project's target groups in Zanzibar.
- **Dedicate specific attention to Pemba and develop a significant part of the project activities in that island.** The project should consider the internal in this exercise and dedicate more attention to the more underprivileged areas: the quantitative data show that Pemba needs some more specific attention on political grievances compared to the situation in Unguja.
- **Carefully plan, supervise and monitor activities in Pemba.** While Peamba's communities need peacebuilding projects and training peacebuilding projects, the government of Zanzibar would not fully approve increased attention because it is an "opposition stronghold". For this reason, Search should liaise with shehias, discuss how to involve local people and maintain the supervision of the full process.
- **Present project activities as peace-oriented and not focused on VE.** The Tanzanian government does not publicly report or entertain discussions on VE. Search should therefore address issues from a peacebuilding perspective and terminology, avoiding direct public reference to violent extremism and recruitment.
- **Foster cross-party dialogue.** The main opposing political parties are in good political terms. They collaborate on strengthening peace in Zanzibar as well as on leading the Zanzibar Government. We suggest the project to leverage existing activities and come up with new ones that would increase bond, trust and collaboration between now and upcoming general elections periods and beyond.
- **Use dialogue opportunities to create grounds for sustainable peace in Zanzibar.** Due to the continued positive progress of the GNU in Zanzibar, community members are living peacefully with each other. Semi-structured conflict resolution dialogues and conflict sensitivity awareness training might be introduced to enhance resilience in local communities as well as at national levels. Political divisions need to be tackled at a later project phase to reduce project risks due to the high sensitivity level surrounding Zanzibar politics.
- **Postpone mediation efforts until later project stages.** Search and its partners have capacities and resources to facilitate mediation, but still limited social and political grounds

in Zanzibar to mediate conflicting parties at the current moment. Zanzibar is currently passing through fragile political structures; therefore, a minor issue/negative perception especially from political/security actors could affect the entire project.

- **Create unique interventions instead of one size fits all mechanisms.** This is because Zanzibar communities' conflict sensitivity differs between one community and the other. For instance, political conflict sensitivity in Tumbatu Island and Nungwi for Unguja Island has a long history since before the 1964 Revolution. Therefore, the project should carefully balance partners and beneficiaries engaged in the project interventions. Meanwhile, Mtambwe, Kojani Island, Tumbe and Sizini communities have higher levels of political sensitivity, anger and resentments against the government compared to those communities in Chake Chake and Mkoani Districts in Pemba.
- **Mainstream disability in the project.** Disability was mentioned a few times as a strongly penalized social group. For instance, they are really affected during violence because they cannot move quickly. Search and partner should consider including components and special attention to people with disability and other at-risk groups, also in consultation with specialized organizations like JUWAUZA.
- **Redefine media training techniques.** Search has done tremendous work in training media personnel as well as local media houses in Tanzania and particularly in both Unguja and Pemba. However, survey results indicate that more than 90% of respondents do not know Search's work in Zanzibar. Basically, almost only the respondents belonging to the CSOs community had knowledge about Search. In this regard, this project should redefine its media training techniques by reaching out to new media persons/media houses and task them to roll out the gained skills and peace messages to their respective audiences. Search's M&E system should also have mechanisms to trace split over impact on the media interventions.
- **Continue to give a central role to youth and women.** Search has always dedicated specific attention to women and youth in Tanzania, as well as in other countries. This attention is fully necessary to implement this project. Women need support both to safely engage in public space and to be trained on social and large-scale conflict transformation. Youth need to be fully part of the current political changes and to engage with local and national political authorities.